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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1445
___________
D’RAYFIELD KARY KHAME SHIPMAN,
                                                                               Appellant
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE; HAROLD STAFFORD;
W. THOMAS MACPHERSON; YVONNE MARSHALL;
LAVINIA MCGINTY; SHERRY ECKEARD; FRAN LALLY;
MIKE BEGATTO; LOCAL 2038 AFSCME
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-00665)
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 6, 2010
Before:  BARRY, FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 25, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
The District Court also denied Shipman’s motion to transfer venue and his motion1
for appointment of counsel.  To the extent Shipman seeks to challenge these denials, we
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.
2
PER CURIAM
In September 2005, D’Rayfield Kary Khame Shipman filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), alleging that he was
discriminated against on the basis of race, color, and sex when he was terminated from
his job with the Delaware Department of Labor.  He named as defendants the State of
Delaware (“the State”), the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees Local 2038 (“the Union”), and individuals employed by those entities (“the
Individual Defendants”).  The District Court granted motions to dismiss filed by the
Union and the Individual Defendants, holding that Shipman failed to state a claim against
the Union and that the Individual Defendants could not be held liable under Title VII.  1
Later, the District Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss based on Shipman’s failure
to prosecute.  Shipman appealed.
Title VII prohibits unlawful employment practices by employers.  See Emerson v.
Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  Indeed, “Congress did not intend to hold
individual employees liable under Title VII.”  Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and
Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).  Because Shipman was employed by
the State, not by any of the Individual Defendants, the District Court properly granted
their motions to dismiss.  Unlike individual employees, “a union may be held liable under
3Title VII.”  Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 95 (3d Cir. 1999).  In this
case, however, Shipman did not claim that the Union “itself instigated or actively
supported” the alleged discrimination.  Id.  Instead, Shipman contended that Union
employees were “in collusion with management” and “failed to assist” when he sought
help.  Thus, we agree that Shipman’s claims against the Union cannot survive a motion to
dismiss.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
In October 2008, the last remaining defendant, the State, propounded
interrogatories to Shipman and filed a request for production of documents.  The State
also noticed Shipman’s deposition for November 6, 2008.  Shipman informed the State
that he would not attend the deposition and filed a request for additional time to complete
discovery.  The District Court granted that request, imposed a discovery deadline of
March 23, 2009, and noted that failure to comply with deadlines would result in dismissal
of the case.  The State re-noticed Shipman’s deposition for March 20, 2009, but he failed
to appear at the scheduled time.  On April 17, 2009, the State filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that Shipman had not complied with court orders and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  The District Court ordered Shipman to show cause why the case should not
be dismissed.  In response, the only justification Shipman provided was that he had
“complied with all directions of the Clerk of the Court and/or Orders from the [C]ourt.” 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.
4A District Court has the authority to dismiss a suit sua sponte for failure to
prosecute by virtue of its inherent powers and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b).  See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630-31 (1962).  When using
dismissal as a sanction, a District Court is ordinarily required to consider and balance six
factors enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863, 868
(3d Cir. 1984).  But when a litigant’s conduct makes adjudication of the case impossible,
such balancing under Poulis is unnecessary.  See Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30
(3d Cir. 1990); see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994).  In this
case, Shipman was afforded additional time to complete discovery, but thereafter failed to
participate in the discovery process.  He did not respond to requests for interrogatories
and production of documents, and he failed to appear for scheduled depositions.  Shipman
offered no response to the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.  The District
Court provided Shipman with an opportunity to explain his failure to participate in the
discovery process, but his response contained no explanation for his inaction.  Although
the District Court did not make explicit findings concerning the Poulis factors, we
conclude that, under these circumstances, dismissal for failure to prosecute was
warranted.
Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
